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Research and Development Deliverables under
Government Contracts, Grants, Cooperative
Agreements and CRADAs: University
Roles, Government Responsibilities

and Contractor Rights
by
Danielle Conway-Jones*
1.

INTRODUCTION

More than anything, the United States Government is committed to research and development that will ensure America's position as the leader of
nations. Nowhere is this truer than in the development of weapons and
weapons systems, for these have, until recently, been the tools of superiority.
From the tanks of World Wars I and II, to the guided weapons systems of
today, to the unmanned fighting and space exploration vehicles of tomorrow,
continued superiority of this nation will depend heavily upon the research
and development of new technologies and innovation that must have dual
uses for both the military and commercial sectors.
In the first half of the twentieth century, the United States Government
was the single largest source of funding for research and development.I During this period, the Government conducted extensive research and development in its own laboratories and in Government-owned laboratories run by
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1.

Jack E. Kerrigan & Christopher J. Brasco, The Technology Transfer Revolution: Legislative History and Future Proposals, 31 PuB. CONT. L.J. 277, 279
(2002) (citing James V. Lacy et al., Technology Transfer Laws Governing Federally Funded Research and Development, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 3 (1991)).
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contractors. 2 The Government oversight agency, the General Accounting Office (renamed the Government Accountability Office under the George W.
Bush Administration), estimated that Government laboratories spent $16.225
billion in Fiscal Year 1990 alone? Despite this investment in research and
development and the immense productivity of these labs in developing patentable inventions, the United States Government began to lose its position
as the leader in funding technology research and development.4 In fact, during the last decade of the twentieth century, technology leadership and funding shifted to private industry, where most research and development dollars
are now spent.5 Representative Tom Davis cited statistics that the military's
share of research and development has declined from 53% to 16% of the
country's total spending from 1960 to 1999, while private sector research and
development spending rose from one-third to two-thirds of the country's total
spending during this time.6
The reasons for the shift in leadership in research and development are
myriad and complex. One factor contributing to this shift in leadership was
the end of the Cold War. With the weapons draw-down following the break
up of Soviet Russia, the military found itself pressured to reduce its budget,
particularly in the areas of research and development.7 Another factor was
the thriving economies of the 1980s and 1990s. Many private sector companies started underwriting their own efforts in research and development and
delivering new technologies and innovations for commercial use, all this
without consideration of military uses, or reliance on Government procurement or Government research and development dollars.8 Yet another factor
contributing to the Government's decline in its leadership role in funding
research and development is the way in which private companies view rights
in their assets, particularly in their intellectual property assets. By no mea-

2.

Ralph C. Nash & John Cibinic, Transfer of Technologyfrom the Government to
the Private Sector: Can it be Effectively Accomplished?, 6 No. 7 NASH &
CIBINIc REP. 40 (1992).

3.

Id.

4.

Nancy 0. Dix et al., Fear and Loathing of Federal Contracting: Are Commercial Companies Really Afraid to do Business with the Federal Government?
Should They Be?, 33 PUB. CONT. L.J. 5, 7 (2003).

5.

Id.

6.

Id.

7.

W. Bruce Shirk, Technology Transfer and Technology Reinvestment-A Comparison of Two Statutory Frameworks, 41 FED. B. NEWS & J. 64, 72 (1994).

8.

See UNDER

SEC'Y OF DEF. FOR ACQUISITION, TECH. AND LoGISTICS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: NAVIGATING THROUGH COMMERCIAL WATERS: ISSUES AND
SOLUTIONS WHEN NEGOTIATING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WITH COMMERCIAL
COMPANIES,

iii-iv

(Version

1.1

Oct.

15,

2001)

available at http://

www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/Docs/intelprop2.pdf (last visited Oct. 8, 2004) [hereinafter "DoD IP GUIDE"].
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sure is this last factor subservient or less important than any of the other
factors that have contributed to the Government's decline as the leader in
funding research and development for dual use purposes. Instead, this last
factor is, in large measure, the reason why the private sector has distanced
itself from research and development relationships, either under contracts or
through grants, with the Federal Government.9
Realizing that global leadership requires achieving an intersection between military and defense leadership, research and development leadership,
and information and technology leadership, the United States Government
has embarked on a mission to redefine its own rhetoric and philosophy about
free markets, intellectual property protection, innovation, and the roles of
various constituents, including Federal contractors, universities, and the private commercial sector, in the research and development industry. The
United States Government is keenly aware that it must look to the private
commercial sector, including small businesses, for leadership in technology
innovation. To ensure that technology innovation retains the characteristic of
dual use, the Federal Government must be in a position to partner with the
private commercial sector as well as universities to ensure that its military
needs are considered during the research and development process.
With a significant amount of research and development funding being
led by the private sector, the Federal Government has had to repackage itself
to be a more attractive candidate for partnership. To support its "re-branding" efforts, the Government has enacted legislation that reduces the economic risks historically encountered by Federal contractors when doing
business with the Govemment.O In addition, the Federal Government has
adjusted its procurement regulations and their underlying rationales to provide more balanced protection for intellectual property produced by contractors." Finally, the Federal Government has determined that standard
procurement contract vehicles will not entice the best and brightest minds in
universities and the private sector to partner with the Government; so in
place of the these standard vehicles, the Government has initiated greater use
of non-traditional, flexible binding instruments to facilitate mutually beneficial partnerships for the development of dual use technologies.12

9.

See generally Dix et al., supra note 4, at 8-9 (explaining the Government's
view about why technically oriented contractors are reluctant to do business
with the Federal Government).

10.

Id.

11.

Id.at 36.

12.

Id. at 8.
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PRIVATE SECTOR, AND UNIVERSITIES

Government's Role in Supporting Research and Development

The United States Government's responsibility to govern and protect the
nation is a primary reason for the spending of taxpayer dollars to acquire
goods, services, and construction for the continued optimal operation of the
American infrastructure. More pointedly, the Department of Defense has the
responsibility to protect and defend the nation and the democratic ideology.
Because of its significant defense role, the Department of Defense has been a
dominant agency in the procurement of research and development as well as
of intellectual property and technology deliverables. 13 In acquiring items
ranging from prototypes to software to weapons systems, the Department of
Defense has played a significant role in developing an industry. In the
United States, technological innovations and a high level of advanced development create new industries and sustain existing ones.' 4 Government and
military needs and requirements create a catalyst for the creation of technology intensive industries, which in turn provide a wide range of professional,
technical, and manufacturing jobs, increase economic productivity, and
strengthen national competitiveness.15
There are also other government policies that affect advanced development indirectly. The Federal Government affects the levels of advanced technology investment in certain areas by both creating incentives for private
firms to invest and in supporting advanced technology in key areas where
private participation is inadequate.16 The Federal Government's policies for
protecting intellectual property are major engines in promoting innovation.
Similarly, the Department of Defense's revised outlook on intellectual property protection for contract deliverables and research and development also
stimulate to some degree dual use innovations.17 Finally, the Federal Government's ability to open markets overseas impacts American firms' willingness and ability to invest in research and development.18 Thus, at the policy
level, the role of the Federal Government as well as the Department of Defense in the facilitation of increased research and development is to ensure an
attractive legislative and regulatory climate for investment in innovation and
advanced technologies.

13.

See DoD IP

GUIDE,

supra note 8, at iii.

14.

See DoD IP

GUIDE,

supra note 8, at 2-1.

15.

DoD IP

16.

See Dix et al., supra note 4, at 26.

17.

See DoD IP

18.

Id.

GUTDE,

supra note 8, at 2- 1.

GUIDE,

supra note 8, at 2-1.

2004]

B.

Research and Development Deliverables

Private Industry's Role in Supporting Research and Development

Like the Federal Government, the private commercial sector plays an
important role in advancing research and development as well as new technologies and innovations. The private sector is responsible for bringing midlevel, applied research and product development to market for maximum
profitability to shareholders.19 Private sector capitalization influences the
growth and development of "start-up" companies.20 The private sector provides much needed capital to smaller companies that tend to operate in the
absence of any revenues for extended periods of time.21 The private sector's
ability to provide original capital facilitates small company pursuits of basic
research that often eventually leads to profitability.22 All of these activities
take capital and investment. Like the Federal Government, private sector
industry recognizes the benefit of collaborations for the purposes of sharing
facilities, sharing ideas, and building on existing research. Accordingly, the
private sector's role is to identify investment opportunities with other business or government sectors to develop new or existing technologies to create
further developments of products, processes, materials, or services that will
enhance the nation's industrial competitiveness.
C.

Higher Education's Role in Supporting Research and
Development

Before World War II, universities were peripheral to the research and
development enterprise of the United States.23 Today research universities
are at the center of American research activities, thanks in large measure to
an extraordinarily successful partnership with the Federal Government.24
The vital role research universities have played in the American economy is
one of the greatest accomplishments of the American economy. 25 As with
the Federal Government and private industry, America's world-renowned research universities have been a driving force behind the nation's primacy in
science and technology.26 The American research university is unquestiona-

19.

See Dix et al., supra note 4, at 24.

20.

STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON SCIENCE,
OUR FUTURE

TOWARD

A

NEW

105TH CONG., REPORT ON UNLOCKING

NATIONAL

SCIENCE

POLICY, pt. 3, at 38-45

(Comm. Print 105-B 1998), available at http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
house/science/cpl05-b/prsecrol.html#40 (last visited Oct. 5, 2004).
21.

Id.

22.

Id.

23.

Id.

24.

See id.

25. Id.
26.

PRESIDENT'S

COMMITTEE

OF

ADVISORS

ON

SCIENCE

AND

TECHNOLOGY

(PCAST), STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES (1995), available at http://www.ostp.gov/
pcast/principles.html (last visited on Oct. 5, 2004).
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bly the best in the world.27 It has successfully combined cutting-edge research and education, yielding an unmatched scientific and engineering
workforce as well as the scientific breakthroughs in numerous critical technologies.28 In fulfilling its role as a catalyst for creating basic research, universities rely on government contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements to
attract the best faculty and students to their institutions to conduct this necessary research.29 In addition, universities remain competitive in research by
building intellectual property portfolios that generate capital for future research and development.30 Furthermore, universities spur philanthropy and
endowments by generating intellectual property portfolios that capture the
imaginations of institutional, corporate, and individual donors. Thus, universities have the significant role of spurring educational and investment excitement in the research and development of new technologies and innovations.
D.

Historical Review of Government Acquisition of Inventions and
Technology

Prior to the 1960s, the Federal Government and very large contractors,
like AT&T and Bell Laboratories, drove the train of research and development and innovation.31 This model of innovation was extremely centralized
and top down in terms of innovative direction. The areas of research and
development that received attention were those areas that specifically interested the Federal Government and its list of large contractors. Thus, to accomplish technological and innovative research, a company had to be willing
to submit to the centralized regime. Under the historical centralized system
of innovation, the Federal Government often insisted upon taking commercial rights to inventions developed during the performance of government
contracts. 32 In return for contract performance, contractors received royaltyfree, non-exclusive licenses for the benefit of the inventors or the inventors'
employers.33 In a time when large contractors received the equivalent of the
benefit of a monopoly environment, such assignments of title to inventions
were not repulsive because market entrants and competitors to these busi-

27.
28.
29.
30.

31.

Id.
Id.
Dix, supra note 17.
Id.
See generally LAWRENCE
COMMONS IN

A

LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE
CONNECTED WORLD (Random House 2001) (describing that

32.

during its time, AT&T's monopoly in communications was not all bad and, in
fact, did lots of good by producing an extraordinary telephone system, linking
85% of American homes, and spending billions of dollars to support telecommunications research. AT&T succeeded during its monopoly to attract the very
best telecommunications researchers.).
Kerrigan & Brasco, supra note 1.

33.

See DoD IP GUIDE, supra note 8, at Appendix E.
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nesses were inconsequential. Historically, the Federal Government allowed
its respective executive agencies to determine when the allocation of rights or
title to inventions had to inure to the Government and usually these determinations varied depending on the needs of the acquiring agency. 34 While most
agencies, including the Department of the Defense, allowed title to remain in
contractors, these agencies reserved for themselves irrevocable, non-exclusive, non-transferable and royalty-free licenses to practice the inventions for
the benefit of the Government.35
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Government's policy on patent
rights came under severe attack by private industry. In various studies, the
Government was seen as a detractor to the full commercialization of inventions for the benefit of the American economy. 36 Observers concluded that
the Government was either not developing technologies or not funding such
development in a proper fashion.37 Likewise, private industry refused to develop technologies in which there would be no control incentive in the commercialization of applied research and development.38 Government and
congressional studies indicated that the Government's research and acquisition policies were incompatible with the development and commercialization
of innovative technologies.39
As evidence of this incompatibility, one need only look at the Federal
Government's posture with respect to ownership of inventions as compared
to industry's posture. Prior to the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980,
various statutes and regulations concerning patents established the Government's right to take title to federally funded patents developed during the
performance of government contracts. 40 In addition, the Government retained the right to distribute the information resulting from these federally
funded projects to the general public.4' The Government premised its right
to release information from these federally funded patents on the theory that
taxpayer dollars paid for the research and its outcomes; therefore, the results

34.

Diane M. Sidebottom, Intellectual Property in FederalGovernment Contracts:
The Past, The Present, and One Possible Future, 33 PUB. CONT. L. J. 63, 67
(2003).

35.

See DoD IP

36.

Kerrigan & Brasco, supra note 1, at 279.

37.

See id. at 282-83.

38.

Id. at 279.

39.

See U.S.

GUIDE,

supra note 8.

CONG., OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, FED. TECH. TRANSFER &

HUMAN GENOME PROJECT,

THE

OTA-GP-HER-162, at 47 (Wash. D.C.: U.S. Gov't

Printing Office, Sept. 1995), available at http://www.wws.princeton.edu/cgibin/byteserv.prl/-ota/diskl/1995/9526/952608.PDF (last visited Oct. 21, 2004)
[hereinafter

"FEDERAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER LEGISLATION"].

40.

See id. at 46.

41.

Id.at 45.
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should inure to the general public.42 Thus, patents from these sponsored
projects were freely published or provided to anyone requesting access to the
materials for unrestricted purposes. 43 Contractors during this time period
were competing without the benefit of government sponsored or approved
monopolies as this was the era of free market competition.44 Accordingly,
free and open access to patents developed during the performance of government contracts presented insurmountable problems to private industry. Contractors wanted to retain the benefits of commercial applications of new
technologies for themselves and any economic benefits that flowed from
their research.45 The thought that the Government would give away freely
what seemed proprietary convinced contractors, universities, and research
centers not to develop potentially commercially viable technologies.46
In response to critical observations and reports about the dysfunctional
nature of Government use and deployment of technology to the market, Congress enacted crucial legislation to balance government and industry interests
in developing and commercializing new technologies.47 Congress enacted a
series of laws to promote technology transfer and to provide technology
transfer mechanisms and incentives.48 The intent of these laws is to encourage partnerships in the use of resources and in the development of dual
use technologies. Three legislative initiatives inspired the decentralization of
the research and development industry - The Stevenson-Wydler Technology
Innovations Act of 1980; 49 the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980;50 and the Federal
Technology Transfer Act of 1986.51 With these three pieces of legislation,
Congress began its trek to enhance private sector development and application of results from federally funded research previously ongoing at universities, research institutions, and federal laboratory facilities.
E.

Technology Transfer History

With the passage of the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act,
Congress for the first time made the transfer of technology from federal labo-

42.

Id.

43.

See DoD IP

44.

See

45.

See DoD IP

46.

Id.

47.

Id.

48.

See

49.

15 U.S.C.A. § 3701 (West Supp. 1980).

50.

Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980) (codified as amended
in various sections of 35 U.S.C.).

51.

15 U.S.C.A. § 3710 (West Supp. 1986).

GUIDE,

supra note 8, at Appendix E-1.

FEDERAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER LEGISLATION,

GUIDE,

supra note 39, at 45.

supra note 8, at Appendix E-1.

FEDERAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER LEGISLATION,

supra note 39, at 45.
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ratories to the private or commercial sector a national priority.52 Primarily a
vehicle to introduce the concept of technology transfer, the Stevenson-Wydler Act stated broad policies to generate previously waning industry interest
in dealings with the Government in the areas of research and development.
The Act focused on disseminating research information from federal laboratories and universities to private industries in order to facilitate technical cooperation.53 While the Act was a permissive statute that encouraged
technology transfer of Government owned inventions as opposed to a requirement to transfer such information, the Act did require the establishment
of an Office of Research and Technology Applications at all Governmentowned-Government operated or Government-owned, Contractor-operated
laboratories with annual budgets greater than $20 million.54 Although technically the impetus for future technology transfer, the Stevenson-Wydler Act
was widely criticized because its permissive, non-authoritative scope generated very little movement within the Federal Government to begin actual
technology transfers for the benefit of exploiting the commercial benefits of
dual use technologies.55
In an effort to promote the policies of the Stevenson-Wydler Act and to
entice contractors, universities, and research centers back into the government industrial base, Congress passed the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980.56 Focused
on generating dual use technologies from basic and applied research, the
Bayh-Dole Act allowed small businesses, non-profit scientific and educational organizations, and universities to retain title to their respective inventions even though those inventions resulted from work performed during the
course of a government contract, grant, or cooperative agreement.5 7 Congress viewed Bayh-Dole as providing a set of broad federal rules governing
patent law that would encourage industry to develop federally funded research into marketable, commercial products.58 As mentioned previously,
the Federal Government, specifically the Department of Defense, generally
maintained the policy that contractors retained title to their inventions, but
the Bayh-Dole Act was the first instance in which legislation clearly articulated this policy. In a contextual view, this mandate is critical when read
against the incentives and limited monopoly provisions of intellectual prop-

52.

See DoD IP

53.

See Barbara A. Duncombe, A Look at the Benefits and Pitfalls of One of the
Country's Best Kept Secrets, 37 FED. B. NEWS & J. 608 (1990).

54.

See W. Bruce Shirk, Technology Transfer and Technology Reinvestment-A
Comparison of Two Statutory Frameworks, 41 FED. B. NEWS & J. 64 (1994).

55.

See Duncombe, supra note 53.

56.

See

57.

See Kerrigan & Brasco, supra note 1, at 279.

58.

See id.

GUIDE,

supra note 8, at Appendix E-1.

FEDERAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER LEGISLATION,

supra note 39, at 46.
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erty legislation, particularly the Patent Act,59 the Copyright Act,60 and the
Lanham Act.61
In its original form, the Bayh-Dole Act did not include large businesses
and government-owned, contractor-operated facilities as beneficiaries of the
mandate to recognize title to inventions in the contractor. 62 This exclusion
was remedied by President Reagan's "Memorandum to the Heads of Executive Department and Agencies: Government Patent Policy," dated February
19, 1983.63 President Reagan's Memorandum directs the heads of all departments and agencies to extend the benefits of Bayh-Dole to all research and
development contractors, including large businesses and profit-making organizations.64 The President's rationale for this sweeping inclusion results
from the view that more often than not "allowing inventing organizations to
retain title to inventions made with Federal support is the best incentive to
obtain risk capital necessary to develop technological innovations."65 The
President and his administration further supported the extension of BayhDole benefits to large businesses by citing that "the new products and
processes that result will improve the productivity of the United States economy, create new jobs, and improve the position of the United States in world
trade."66
The 1980 legislative attempts at launching technology transfer received
a significant boost by the passage of the Federal Technology Transfer Act of
1986 ("FTTA").67 The FTTA authorized the promotion of economic competitiveness in research and development by recognizing that applied research would be a significant factor to achieve success in the global
marketplace. The Act also required federal agencies to work closely with
industry to accomplish technology transfer of research from federal laboratories; and it tied significant government employee and laboratory incentives to
any government-industry relationship that became commercially profitable.68
The crowning features of the FTTA include placing responsibility of technol-

59.
60.

35 U.S.C. § 101, et seq. (1952).
17 U.S.C. § 101, et seq. (2000).

61.

15 U.S.C. § 1051, et seq. (2000).

62.

See Kerrigan & Brasco, supra note 1, at 280.

63.

Memorandum to the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 19
Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 252, 253 (Feb. 18, 1983).

64.
65.

Id.
President's Memorandum to the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies: Government Patent Policy Fact Sheet, at http://www.hq.nasa.gov/ogc/intellectual-property/memotoheads.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2004).

66.

Id.

67.

Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-502, 100 Stat. 1785
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
Duncomb, supra note 52, at 609.

68.
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ogy transfer success with federal laboratory scientists and engineers, creating
a reward system for government employees, providing funding for technology transfer initiatives, providing for the exchange of personnel, services,
and equipment with industry partners, and authorizing federal laboratory directors to enter into cooperative research and development agreements
("CRADAs") with private industry.
Arguably, the proactive authority for federal laboratory directors to
enter into CRADAs is groundbreaking and transformative. Federal laboratories have broad authority to fashion CRADAs in any way that permits a maximum exchange of technology.69 However, this authority expressly stops
short of allowing a federal laboratory to turn over its appropriated funds to a
private company as an incentive to enter into a CRADA.70 This limitation is
necessary in order to comply with the Competition in Contracting Act.71
Without the limitation, federal laboratories could circumvent the requirement
of full and open competition-the overarching principle that promotes the
integrity of the federal procurement system.
Technology transfer legislation has the potential of renewing old ties
between government, private industry, and universities. The broad authority
that permits federal laboratories to enter into CRADAs for research and development in areas of technology consistent with the laboratory's mission
has been credited with enticing private industry and universities to seek out
advantageous relationships with particular government laboratories.72 The
deployment and use of CRADAs allow for arm's length negotiations of research and development agreements with user-defined provisions related to
title and ownership interests, free flow of information, use of state of the art
laboratories and equipment, access to personnel with unique experiences and
technical capabilities, and profit sharing arrangements following the successful commercial exploitation of applied research.
The future success of technology transfer largely depends on the public's awareness of the importance of science and technology to market economies, education, national security, and government acquisitions. Also, the
success of technology transfer equally depends on public perceptions of fairness and integrity regarding the exercise of government functions. To increase public awareness about technology transfer, it is imperative that
government agencies, private industry, and universities, both large and small,
appreciate the Federal Government's methods for obtaining goods and services with aspects of intellectual property or new technologies. How the
Government categorizes goods and services will determine the required approach to contract vehicles or cooperative agreements used to establish mutu69.

See Shirk, supra note 5, at 65.

70.

Shirk, supra note 5, at 66.

71.

See generally Competition in Contracting Act, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat.
1175, (codified as amended in scattered sections of 31 U.S.C. & 41 U.S.C.).

72.

See Dix et al., supra note 3, at 30.
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ally beneficial relationships. The vehicles that define and balance contractual
relationships have different characteristics, purposes, and outcomes. For
each vehicle to accomplish its respective goals, all users of the various vehicles must have some working knowledge of the instrument's scope and effectiveness. Accordingly, the remainder of this article will describe when
certain vehicles, ranging from procurement contracts to CRADAs, should be
used to accomplish a particular goal of the Government in receiving research
and development.
F.

Procurement Contracts

The major statute governing competition requirements in federal contracting is the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 ("CICA").73 The
CICA requires executive agencies to seek full and open competition in all
sealed bid or negotiated procurements, except as specifically permitted by
statute. 74 "Full and open competition" is defined as permitting all responsible sources to submit sealed bids or competitive proposals in response to
Government solicitations.
The Government's policy regarding competition has been revised with
the enactment of the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act ("FASA")75 and
the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996.76 These revisions allow the Government to

73.

74.
75.

76.

See 41 U.S.C. § 253 (2000), Pub. L. 98-369, 98 Stat. 1175 (1984). The Competition and Contracting Act of 1984 amended Title III of the Federal Property
and Administrative Services Act of 1949 to establish a statutory preference for
the use of competitive procedures in awarding federal contracts for property or
services. It also requires the use of competitive procedures by federal agencies
when purchasing goods or services with sealed or competitive bids. And, it
directs the head of each agency to appoint an advocate who will challenge
barriers to competition in the procurement of property and services by the
agency and review the agency's procurement activities. Division D of Public
Law 104-106 contains language that retains the current statutory competition
standard, but it also requires that the standard be applied consistently with the
government's need to "efficiently" fulfill its requirements. Further provisions
allow competition officials more discretion in determining the number of proposals in the "competitive range," to provide for pre-award debriefings of unsuccessful offerors, and to authorize the use of special two-phase procedures
for design and construction of public buildings.
See 10 U.S.C. § 2304 (2000); 41 U.S.C. § 253 (2000).
See Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act, Pub. L. No. 103-355, 108 Stat. 3243
(1994). In the FASA, Congress made various changes that encourage and reward innovation in acquisition, increase the procurement of commerciallyavailable items in more streamlined procedures, place more emphasis on past
contractor performance and best value contracting in making source selections,
and encourage greater professional development of the government's procurement workforce.
See Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106, § 5202, 110 Stat. 186
(1996). The Clinger-Cohen Act encourages agencies to use modular con-
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procure goods and services with greater ease by placing the government in a
position similar to a commercial buyer. While the government evolves into a
quasi-commercial entity in certain procurements, it still remains responsible
for ensuring competition to the maximum extent practicable. The Federal
Acquisition Regulation continues to set forth the government's requirements
in the area of competition.77 Thus, to satisfy competition requirements, not
every prospective bidder need be afforded the opportunity to bid. This interpretation is based upon the Government's efforts to reasonably inform prospective bidders of work, not requiring the Government to inform all
prospective bidders.78 This adequacy of competition can be challenged if a
bidder or offeror can show that the Government had a conscious and deliber-

tracting by stating that they "should, to the maximum extent practicable, use
modular contracting for an acquisition of a major system of information technology." Id. It further directs that the FAR provide that acquisitions of major
systems of information technology may be divided into several smaller acquisition increments that: (1) are easier to manage individually than in one comprehensive acquisition; (2) address complex information technology objectives
incrementally in order to enhance the likelihood of achieving workable solutions for attainment of those objectives; (3) provide for delivery, implementation, and testing of workable systems or solutions in discrete increments each
of which comprises a system or solution that is not dependent on any subsequent increment in order to perform its principal functions; and (4) provide an
opportunity for subsequent increments of the acquisition to take advantage of
any evolution in technology or needs that occur during performance of earlier
increments. See id. The statute additionally states that modular contract increments should be awarded to the maximum extent practicable within 180 days
after the date on which the solicitation is issued, and if the contract for that
increment cannot be awarded within that time, it should be considered for cancellation. See id. It also states that the information technology provided for in
the modular contract should be delivered within 18 months after the date on
which the solicitation was issued. See id.
77.

See 48 C.F.R. § 6.000 (1995) (setting forth "policies and procedures to promote
full and open competition in the acquisition process and to provide for full and
open competition, full and open competition after exclusion of sources, other
than full and open competition, and competition advocates").

78.

See 48 C.F.R. § 6.101 (1995). The policy of this regulation appears as follows:
10 U.S.C. 2304 and 41 U.S.C. 253 require, with certain limited exceptions
(see subparts 6.2 and 6.3), that contracting officers shall promote and provide for full and open competition in soliciting offers and awarding Government contracts.
Contracting officers shall provide for full and open competition through use of
the competitive procedure(s) contained in this subpart that are best suited to the
circumstances of the contract action and consistent with the need to fulfill the
Government's requirements efficiently. Id.
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ate intent to impede the participation of prospective bidders.79 The Federal
Government's acquisition of deliverables that contain features or components
of intellectual property are subject to the Federal Acquisition Regulation and
the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation. Practically, what that means is
that the Federal Government's standard boilerplate language is the starting
point for such solicitations. Typically, the procurement of technology will
subject government contractors and others performing under government
contracts to the data rights provisions of the Government's acquisition regulations.80 For purposes of this article, the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation will be the primary reference because most technology in this area is
procured by the Department of Defense. These regulations are constantly
evolving and, thus, create a landmine for the unwary. The task of analyzing
and applying these regulations is not made any easier when the Government
procures research and development.
When the Government contracts for research and development, it will
frequently require the contractor to deliver technical information in a form
that is usable to the Government in the future. This information typically
consists of specifications, drawings, technical reports, maintenance and operating manuals, parts lists, computer software, and other types of recorded
information. This compilation of information is referred to as technical data.
Often, the drafters of the regulations as well as the contracting agencies have
conflated the data submission requirements for research and development
contracts with rights in data that represent the actual deliverable sought by
the agency. The former information can be characterized as instructions that
assist the Government in understanding and using the deliverable, while the
latter is the actual deliverable. Obviously, these fine distinctions can create
problems for contractors and the Government in the event of a dispute.
There are also substantial difficulties in assessing how much information the
contractor should turn over to the Government and what protection the Government will afford to the information or the deliverable that the contractor
submits pursuant to the requirements of the procurement contract. The
problems emanate from the distinct interests of the Government versus the
contractor. The Government is concerned with acquiring a deliverable, but
also operating and maintaining the deliverable from many points around the
globe, while the contractor is concerned with protecting its competitive edge
or know-how within the industry. Contractors are also much more aware of
their intellectual property and proprietary rights, especially with respect to
achieving maximum commercial exploitation of that intellectual property.
The Federal Government, especially the Department of Defense, is
keenly aware that its past practices in the realm of procurements involving

79.

See Abel Converting Inc. v. United States, 679 F. Supp. 1133, 1139 (D.D.C.
1988).

80. For the purposes of this article, the Government's license rights in both technical data as well as computer software shall be simply referred to as "data
rights."
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intellectual property garnered very few fans in various segments of the procurement community, much less truly commercial businesses. In an effort to
woo these contractors and businesses back to the Federal research and development sector, the Federal Government, specifically, the Department of Defense, revised its regulations to try to seek a balance between the competing
interests of the contractor on one hand and the Government on the other. The
new regulations explicitly provide that the Government obtains rights in
technical data under an irrevocable license granted or obtained for the Government by the contractor. 81 The contractor on the other hand retains all
rights in the data not granted to the Government, which means that the contractor is the owner of the technical data in the event that national security,
export controls, or prior Government rights do not limit the contractor's ownership interest.82 The Government's license or use rights fall into three categories and one outlying category. The three categories include a limited
rights license,83 a Government purpose rights license,84 and an unlimited
rights license.85 The outlying category is called a special negotiated license, 86 which is formed under special circumstances. The categories determine what uses the Government can make of the technical data that it
receives from a particular contractor. The category of license that will apply
to the Government is determined by the source of funding the contractor
received in performing the Government contract. 87
The Government is entitled to unlimited use rights in technical data in
various situations, notably when the data pertaining to items, components, or
processes have been or will be developed exclusively with Government
funds or when technical data is generated directly from the performance of
experimental, developmental, or research work specified as an element of
performance under a government contract or subcontract.88 The broad scope
of this use right entitles the Government to use or disclose technical data to
anyone for any purpose. 89 Moreover, the Government retains the right to
permit others to use or to disclose the technical data with few restrictions.90
Notably, this license permits the Government to disclose technical data to a
contractor's competitor. The scope and breadth of the unlimited use rights
stabs at the heart of all things proprietary. While the disclosure of technical

81. 48 C.F.R. § 227.7103-4 (1995).
82. Id.
83. Id. § 252.227-7013(a)(13).
84. Id. § 252.227-7013(a)(12).
85. Id. § 252.227-7013(a)(15).
86. Id. § 252.227-7013(b)(4).
87. Id. § 252.227-7013(b)(1)-(b)(4).
88. Id. § 252.227-7013(b)(1)(iii).
89.

Id. § 252.227-7013(a)(15).

90.

Id.
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data under the government contract does not destroy the nature of a contractor's information as a trade secret or as proprietary information, the future
right of another to disclose the trade secret obtained from the Government
will destroy the proprietary and secret character of the information. For this
reason alone, private industry contractors interested in research and development will shy away from doing research under government contracts. To
encourage commercial utilization of technologies developed under government contracts, the provisions instruct that the Government may agree to
accept technical data subject to Government purpose license rights.91 This
reduction in use rights is an example of the Department of Defense's compromise in recognizing the intellectual property and proprietary interests of
private industry.
The Government is entitled to only Government purpose license rights
in technical data associated with an item, component, or process developed in
part with Government funds and in part at private expense whenever a contractor provides notice of such mixed funding with respect to such data.92
This type of license anticipates a prior negotiation between the Government
and the contractor. The Government purpose rights license grants the Government a right to use, modify, disclose, or release technical data within the
Government without restriction, but limits similar conduct to only Government purposes when the technical data will be released outside of the Government to a third party who must agree to a use and non-disclosure
agreement that limits the third party's use to the same Government purposes. 93 The time period for the life of a Government purpose rights license
is five years, after which the license converts to an unlimited use rights license. 94 Examples of Government purposes include competitive procurement and foreign military sales.95 Government purposes obviously do not
include disclosure of technical data for commercial purposes. The problem
that the private industry has identified with Government purpose rights is that
the five-year window of time to commercialize a dual use technology may
not be long enough to recoup the private portion of the mixed-funding investment in the item, component, or process before the Government purpose

91.

48 C.F.R. § 252.227-7013(a)(13) (1995).

92.

Id. § 252.227-7013(b)(l)(ix)(B)(2)(i)(A).

93.

Dix, supra note 4, at 16.

94. 48 C.F.R. § 252.227-7013(b)(2)(ii) (1995).
95.

See generally id. § 252.227-7013(a)(11) (2004) (defining Government purpose
as any activity in which the United States Government is a party, including
cooperative agreements with international or multi-national defense organizations, or sales or transfers by the United States Government to foreign governments or international organizations. Government purposes include
competitive procurement, but do not include the rights to use, modify,
reproduce, release, perform, display, or disclose technical data for commercial
purposes or authorize others to do so.).
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rights license converts into an unlimited rights license for the benefit of the
Government.
The Government obtains only a limited rights license in unpublished
technical data pertaining to items, components, or process developed exclusively at private expense, provided that the contractor properly marks the
technical data with the appropriate limited rights legends before submitting
the technical data to the Government.96 The limited rights license allows the
7
Government to use or disclose technical data only within the Government.9
The Government cannot use the data to manufacture the item, component, or
process, except in the event that an emergency repair or overhaul is required.98 The Government may, however, with the contractor's consent, disclose the technical data to third parties who may need to provide service and
support for the item, component, or process. 99
Finally, the Government can enter into negotiations with a contractor to
develop a special license.100 The standard rights referred to above may not
satisfy either the contractor's needs or the Government's needs. In rare situations, the Government may even be willing to accept lesser rights in technical
data. The purpose for specially negotiated rights is to allow the Government
to assess its true minimum needs. If the Government can take lesser rights
than it is entitled to under a particular procurement, then the Government
should take such an opportunity to develop goodwill amongst its contractors.
Several provisions may be the subject matter of a specially negotiated license, including escrowing technical data with third parties unless and until
an actual Government contingency is encountered, limiting the particular use
of technical data to a certain agency instead of allowing full disclosure within
the entire Government, and extending the time limit when Government purpose rights license converts to unlimited license rights.
G.

Other Transaction

The Other Transaction vehicle is not a procurement contract, grant or
cooperative agreement, or a cooperative research and development agreement ("CRADA"), but it is a legal instrument to be used when it is not appropriate or feasible to use a procurement contract or a cooperative
agreement. 101 Often referred to as "freedom of contract" instruments, Other

96.

Id. § 252.227-7013(b)(3)(A).

97.
98.

Id. § 252.227-7013(a)(13).
Id. § 252.227-7013(a)(13)(i).

99.
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Inc. 2000).
100. 48 C.F.R. § 227.7103-5 (1995).
101. 10 U.S.C. § 2371(e)(2) (2000).
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Transaction vehicles are subject to fewer laws and regulations than procurement contracts and CRADAs.102 The Department of Defense is one of the
few agencies authorized to use the Other Transaction instrument, which may
be of two types.
The first type is the Science and Technology Other Transaction, which
can be used to accomplish basic research, applied research, or advanced research projects.103 The characteristics of a Science and Technology Other
Transaction include a funds out mechanism in which the Government pays
funds for the research, but the Government seeks, when practicable, a 50%
cost share agreement. 104 In addition, the Government cannot duplicate already existing research.105 Finally, the Government must report the use of
the Science and Technology Other Transaction instrument to Congress.106
The second type of Other Transaction is the Prototype Other Transaction, which is directly relevant for the development of weapons or weapons
systems that the Department of Defense plans to acquire.107 The characteristics of this type of Other Transaction are again flexibility, the proscription
that prototype research cannot already be ongoing under another contract
mechanism, the contractor is paid according to a funds out method from the
Government, cost sharing by the contractor is not required, a fee or profit is
available for the contractor, the Government uses competitive procedures
when practicable, and the agency must provide a report to Congress annually
when the instrument is used to acquire a prototype. 108 In essence, the use of
an Other Transaction instrument is akin to allowing the Government and the
contractor to write a contract beginning with a blank sheet of paper as opposed to incorporating myriad contract clauses required by the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation or the many regulations of the Office of
Management and Budget. The Other Transaction vehicle is probably the
closest the Government will ever come to negotiating agreements like market
participants in private industry. Negotiating terms from the inception of a
relationship allows the contractor to maintain a competitive advantage in the
commercial marketplace while permitting the Government to have access to
cutting-edge technologies.
H.

Grants and Cooperative Agreements

Most Government activities are carried out directly by the Government
or under funds out agreements with other parties for the benefit of the Gov-

102. Dix, supra note 4, at 26.
103. Id. at 25.
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. Dix, supra note 4, at 24.
108. Id. at 25.
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emnment. Grants and cooperative agreements, while funds out mechanisms,
are not procurement instruments and, therefore, these instruments cannot be
used to acquire goods and services for the direct benefit of the Government.109 Despite this restriction, the Government can use a grant or cooperative agreement vehicle if the Government's primary purpose in doing so is to
provide technical assistance or promote assistance relationships for the public. A Federal agency may use a grant or cooperative agreement instead of a
procurement contract when
the principal purpose of the relationship is to transfer a thing of
value to the State or local government or other recipient to carry
out a public purpose of support or stimulation authorized by a law
of the United States instead of acquiring (by purchase, lease, or
barter) property or services for the direct benefit or use of the
United States Government...

110

The choice between using a grant or a cooperative agreement depends on
whether the Government intends to be substantially involved in the project.
If there is substantial Government involvement, then the appropriate instrument for use is a cooperative agreement; otherwise, when Government involvement is less than substantial, then the appropriate instrument for use is a
grant. 1 ' Federal grants and cooperative agreements are relatively flexible in
that they are only subject to the Office of Management and Budget's informal advisories and agency regulations.112
I.

Cooperative Research and Development Agreements

A Cooperative Research and Development Agreement ("CRADA") is
defined as any agreement between one or more Federal laboratories and one
or more non-Federal parties under which the Government, through its laboratories, provides personnel, services, facilities, equipment, intellectual property, or other resources with or without reimbursement (but not funds to nonFederal parties) and the non-Federal parties provide funds, personnel, services, facilities, equipment, intellectual property, or other resources toward
the conduct of specified research or development efforts that are consistent
with the missions of the laboratory.]3
The primary purpose of a CRADA is to encourage the transfer of commercially useful technology from Federal laboratories to the private sector.
Unlike funds out agreements where the Government distributes appropriated
109. Dix, supra note 4, at 27.

110. 31 U.S.C. §§ 6304(1), 6305(1) (2000).
111. Id. § 6304(2).
112. See Kurt M. Rylander, Scanwell Plus: Challenging the Propriety of a Federal
Agency's Decision to Use a Federal Grant and Cooperative Agreement, 28
PUB. CONT. L. J. 69, 70-71 (1998).

113. 15 U.S.C. § 3710a(d)(1) (2000).
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funds to a contractor, grantor, or collaborator, CRADAs expressly prohibit
14
the distribution of appropriated funds to a non-Federal CRADA party.
Cooperative Research and Development Agreement authority emanates
from the Stevenson-Wydler Act.115 All Federal Government-owned laboratories, which are operated either by Government personnel or contractor personnel, have flowed down CRADA authority.116 Unlike garden-variety
procurement contracts, there are no government-wide standard clauses or
regulations for CRADAs. In fact, CRADAs are distinguishable from procurement contracts in one major respect - the transfer of funds for CRADA
collaboration flows, if at all, from the contractor or private entity to the Federal laboratory, and not the other way. In addition, Federal laboratory directors do not enter CRADAs for research and development that are inconsistent
with that particular laboratory's mission. Furthermore, CRADA relationships are typically characterized by a private non-Federal entity directing the
research and development of a project as opposed to the Government directing the research and development. With such a relationship, the private
entity is bearing more of the risk as compared to the Government laboratory.
Thus, the protection afforded by strict contract clauses and regulations for the
benefit of the Government and for the taxpayer is relatively unnecessary to
achieve during the performance of a CRADA because the risks of nonperformance are borne, at least financially, by the private entity partner to the
CRADA.
Because there are no strict requirements for contract clauses and provisions, a director of a laboratory may negotiate terms including licensing
agreements, payment of funds into the Government, the availability of personnel and services, intellectual property agreements, the granting of presumptive rights to inventions, and the waiver of Government rights to
inventions except for a Government purpose license. The CRADA mechanism is a very flexible approach to maintaining a relationship with the Government and directing Government research and development without many
of the risks of loss of intellectual property or proprietary interests. The benefits of CRADAs are myriad and the private industry can take advantage of
the opportunity to partner with the Federal Government to develop and then
commercialize dual use technologies.
Il.

CONCLUSION

There are many roles to be played in the research and development of
technology for the 21st Century. Innovation depends on industry players
performing these roles under optimal circumstances. The Government has
the role of setting policy, promoting leadership in innovation, and providing

114. Carl L. Vacketta et al., Technology Transfer, 94-12
(1994).
115. Shirk, supra note 7, at 65-66.
116. See id.
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the means and the mechanisms to accomplish research and development at
the basic research, applied research, and advanced research levels of science
and technology. A significant role for the Government is to train its agencies, departments, and personnel about supporting innovation efforts through
correct identification and uses of contractual vehicles to form lasting and
productive relationships with private industry and universities to ensure continued leadership in research and development. Likewise, private industry
and universities have distinct roles to play in providing resource capital investment and human capital investment, respectively. In addition, private
industry and universities must seek out opportunities to collaborate with Federal, State, and local governments to advance research and development for
the continued growth of community as well as national infrastructures.
Finally, there may be times when the Government, private industry, and
universities must also balance the national interest in promoting knowledge
innovation with the conveyance of individual proprietary interests. There
may be circumstances in which the national public interest must prevail over
individual property rights in order to achieve strong leadership in the research and development of technology and innovation. Procurement laws
and policies were established to balance the very interests of fair competition
with social and economic interests of the nation-state. This balancing is no
less important in the various segments of the entire procurement community.
One thing is clear: successful collaboration for optimal research and development outcomes is only assured when all parties are well versed in the mechanisms applicable to building contractual and special relationships with the
Government for the advancement of technology and innovation.

